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零售角度央行数字货币技术【完整版】

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零售角度央行数字货币技术【完整版】

 

 Raphael Auer raphael.auer@bis.org

 Rainer Böhme rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at

  The technology of retail central bank digital currency 1

  Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) promise to provide cash-like safety and convenience for peer-to-peer

 payments.

 To

 do

 so,

 they

 must

 be

 resilient

 and

 accessible.

 They

 should

 also safeguard the user’s privacy, while allowing for effective law enforcement. Different technical designs

 satisfy

 these

 attributes

 to

 varying

 degrees,

 depending

 on

 whether

 they

 feature intermediaries,

 a

 conventional

 or

 distributed

 infrastructure,

 account-

 or

 token-based

 access, and

 retail

 interlinkages

 across

 borders.

 We

 set

 out

 the

 underlying

 trade-offs

 and

 the

 related hierarchy of design choices. JEL

 classification:

 E42,

 E44,

 E51,

 E58,

 G21,

 G28.

 The question of whether central banks should issue digital currency to the general public has attracted increasing attention. This special feature sketches out some key technological

 design

 considerations

 for

 a

 retail

 CBDC,

 in

 the

 event

 that

 a

 central bank decided to issue one. We do not investigate the case for or against issuance, the systemic implications, or how these might be managed. 2

 We

  structure

  our

  approach

  around

  consumer

  needs

  and

  the

  associated technical design choices. Current electronic retail money represents a claim on an intermediary, rather than functioning as the digital equivalent of cash. CBDCs could potentially

 provide

 a

 cash-like

 certainty

 for

 peer-to-peer

 payments.

 At

 the

 same time, they should offer convenience, resilience, accessibility, privacy and ease of use in cross-border payments. Different technical designs meet these criteria to varying degrees, with attendant technical trade-offs. We explore these issues. The aim is not to promote or highlight any particular approach, but to lay some groundwork for more systematic discussions.

  1

 We

  thank

  Morten

  Bech,

  Codruta

  Boar,

  Claudio

  Borio,

  Stijn

  Claessens,

  Benoît

  Cœuré,

  Jon

  Frost, Leonardo

 Gambacorta,

 Marc

 Hollanders,

 Henry

 Holden,

 Ross

 Leckow,

 Cyril

 Monet,

 Hyun

 Song

 Shin, Rastko

  Vrbaski,

  Amber

  Wadsworth

  and

  Philip

  Wooldridge

  for

  comments,

  and

  Haiwei

  Cao,

  Giulio Cornelli

 and

 Alan

 Villegas

 for

 exceptional

 research

 assistance.

 The

 views

 expressed

 in

 this

 article

 are those

 of

 the

 authors

 and

 do

 not

 necessarily

 reflect

 those

 of

 the

 Bank

 for

 International

 Settlements.

 2

 For

 the

 systemic

 implications,

 see

 the

 survey

 in

 CPMI-MC

 (2018).

 Andolfatto

 (2018),

 Kumhof

 and Noone

 (2018),

 and

 Bindseil

 (2020)

 examine

 how

 the

 impact

 on

 the

 central

 bank’s

 balance

 sheet

 can be

 managed,

 while

 Brunnermeier

 and

 Niepelt

 (2019)

 investigate

 how

 financial

 instability

 risks

 can be

 mitigated.

  Our

 approach

 is

 graphically

 represented

 in

 the

 “CBDC

 pyramid”,

 which

 maps consumer

 needs

 onto

 the

 associated

 design

 choices

 for

 the

 central

 bank.

 This scheme forms a hierarchy in which the lower layers represent design decisions that feed into subsequent, higher-level decisions. We

 start

 by

 introducing

 the

 four

 main

 design

 choices,

 as

 represented

 in

 the four layers of the CBDC pyramid. We

 assess the legal

 structure of

 claims

 and the operational

 roles

 of

 the

 central

 bank

 and

 private

 institutions

 in

 different

 CBDC architectures.

 We

 discuss

 the

 choice

 between

 distributed

 ledger

 technology

 (DLT) and

 a

 centrally

 controlled

 infrastructure.

 We

 compare

 token-based

 systems

 and account-based

 systems.

 Before

 concluding,

 we

 assess

 how

 the

 development

 of CBDCs might reinforce current efforts to overhaul cross-border payments.

  From

 consumer

 needs

 to

 design

 choices:

 the

 CBDC

 pyramid

  The

 focus

 of

 our

 approach

 is

 the

 “retail”

 aspect

 of

 CBDC;

 we

 ask

 what

 consumer needs a CBDC could address. 3

 We thus sketch the development of a CBDC through an approach that proceeds from consumer needs to design choices. 4

 The left-hand side

 of

 the

 CBDC

 pyramid

 (Graph 1)

 sets

 out

 such

 consumer

 needs

 and

 six associated features that would make a CBDC useful. Starting with cash-like peer-to- peer

  usability,

  these

  features

  also

  comprise

  convenient

  real-time

  payments, payments

 security,

 privacy,

 wide

 accessibility

 and

 ease

 of

 use

 in

 cross-border payments. The pyramid’s right-hand side lays out the associated design choices. The consumer’s prime need is that the CBDC embodies a cash-like claim on the central

 bank,

 ideally

 transferable

 in

 peer-to-peer

 settings.

 Today,

 even

 consumers who

 normally

 prefer

 to

 pay

 electronically

 are

 confident

 that,

 if

 an

 episode

 of financial turmoil were to threaten, they could shift their electronic money holdings into cash. This flight to cash has been seen in many crisis episodes, including recent ones.

 The

 main

 concern

 is

 that

 if,

 in

 the

 future,

 cash

 were

 no

 longer

 generally

  3

 All

  private

  sector

  non-financial

  users

  are

  referred

  to

  as

  “consumers”

  in

  what

  follows.

  For

  a discussion

 of

 “wholesale”

 CBDC

 for

 use

 in

 the

 financial

 industry,

 see

 CPMI-MC

 (2018).

 4

 The

 survey

 in

 Boar

 et

 al

 (2020)

 highlights

 that

 central

 banks

 have

 advanced

 other

 motivations

 for issuance,

  including

  monetary

  policy

  implementation

  and

  financial

  stability

  considerations.

  These aspects

 are

 considered

 in

 the

 CBDC

 design

 frameworks

 of

 Fung

 and

 Halaburda

 (2016),

 Bjerg

 (2017), CPMI-MC

  (2018),

  Mancini-Griffoli

  et

  al

  (2018),

  Wadsworth

  (2018),

  Kahn

  et

  al

  (2019)

  and

  Adrian (2019).

  Although

  it

  takes

  a

  more

  positive

  stance

  towards

  CBDC,

  our

  focus

  on

  technical

  design elements

 is

 related

 to

 Pichler

 et

 al’s

 (2020)

 analysis

 of

 the

 limits

 of

 CBDC

 when

 compared

 with

 cash.

  86 BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020 Key takeaways

  A trusted and widely usable retail CBDC must be secure and accessible, offer cash-like convenience and safeguard privacy.  Various technical designs satisfy these criteria to different degrees, and the associated trade-offs need to be identified.  The design of a retail CBDC needs to balance the credibility of direct claims on the central bank with the benefits of using payment intermediaries.

 accepted, a severe financial crisis might create further havoc by disrupting day-to- day business and retail transactions. 5

 At

 the

 same

 time,

 consumers

 are

 unlikely

 to

 adopt

 a

 CBDC

 if

 it

 is

 less convenient

 to

 use

 than

 today’s

 electronic

 payments.

 Banks

 and

 payment

 service providers

 run

 sophisticated

 infrastructures that

 can

 handle

 peak demand,

 such

 as on Singles Day in China or Black Friday in the United States. And intermediaries help to smooth the flow of payments by taking on risk, for example during connectivity breaks or offline payments. These

 two

 needs

 –

 cash-like

 safety

 and

 convenience

 of

 use

 –

 lead

 to

 the foundational

 design

 consideration

 for

 a

 CBDC

 (see

 lowest

 layer

 of

 pyramid

 in Graph 1):

 the

 choice

 of

 the

 operational

 architecture,

 and

 how

 it

 will

 balance

 the consumer’s demand for a cash-like claim on the central bank with the convenience that

 intermediaries

 confer

 on

 the

 payment

 system.

 The

 choice

 is

 shaped

 by

 two questions. Is the CBDC a direct claim on the central bank or is the claim indirect, via payment

 intermediaries?

 What

 is

 the

 operational

 role

 of

 the

 central

 bank

 and

 of private sector intermediaries in day-to-day payments? Further, the consumer’s need for cash-like payment safety means that a CBDC must be secure not only from the insolvency or technical glitches of intermediaries, but

 also

 from

 outages

 at

 the

 central

 bank.

 The

 choice

 is

 whether

 to

 base

 this infrastructure on a conventional centrally controlled database or instead on DLT – technologies

 that

 differ

 in

 their

 efficiency

 and

 degree

 of

 protection

 from

 single

 The

 CBDC

 pyramid

 Graph 1

 The CBDC pyramid maps consumer needs (left-hand side) onto the associated design choices for the central bank (right-hand side). The four layers of the right-hand side form a hierarchy in which the lower layers represent design choices that feed into subsequent, higher- level decisions. Source: Authors’ elaboration.

  5

 In

 Sweden,

 where

 cash

 use

 has

 already

 declined

 substantially,

 considerations

 along

 these

 lines

 have led

 the

 central

 bank

 to

 propose

 a

 review

 of

 the

 concept

 of

 legal

 tender

 (Sveriges

 Riksbank

 (2019)).

  BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020

 87

 points of failure. Importantly, this decision can only be made once the architecture has been decided upon, as DLT is only feasible for some operational setups. This is why the choice of infrastructure lies in the pyramid’s second layer. Two

  further

  consumer

  needs

  are

  easy,

  universal

  access

  and

  privacy

  by default. 6

 From

 a

 technical

 perspective,

 there

 is

 an

 underlying

 trade-off

 between privacy and ease of access on the one hand and ease of law enforcement on the other. The associated design choice – the pyramid’s third layer – is whether access to

 the

 CBDC

 is

 tied

 to

 an

 identity

 system

 (ie

 an

 account-based

 technology)

 or instead via

 cryptographic

 schemes that do

 not

 require

 identification

 (ie

 an

 access technology based on so-called digital tokens). The final consumer need we consider is that CBDCs should also enable cross- border payments. At a design level, this could be arranged via technical connections at

 the

 wholesale

 level

 that

 are

 built

 on

 today’s

 systems.

 Alternatively,

 novel interlinkages could be envisaged at the retail level, ie allowing consumers to hold foreign digital currencies directly. Importantly, the means of implementing the latter option would depend on whether the CBDC was account- or token-based. This is why this design choice belongs in the top layer of the pyramid.

  Architecture:

 indirect

 or

 direct

 claims,

 and

 the

 operational role

 fo...

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