下面是小编为大家整理的零售角度央行数字货币技术【完整版】,供大家参考。
Raphael Auer raphael.auer@bis.org
Rainer Böhme rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at
The technology of retail central bank digital currency 1
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) promise to provide cash-like safety and convenience for peer-to-peer
payments.
To
do
so,
they
must
be
resilient
and
accessible.
They
should
also safeguard the user’s privacy, while allowing for effective law enforcement. Different technical designs
satisfy
these
attributes
to
varying
degrees,
depending
on
whether
they
feature intermediaries,
a
conventional
or
distributed
infrastructure,
account-
or
token-based
access, and
retail
interlinkages
across
borders.
We
set
out
the
underlying
trade-offs
and
the
related hierarchy of design choices. JEL
classification:
E42,
E44,
E51,
E58,
G21,
G28.
The question of whether central banks should issue digital currency to the general public has attracted increasing attention. This special feature sketches out some key technological
design
considerations
for
a
retail
CBDC,
in
the
event
that
a
central bank decided to issue one. We do not investigate the case for or against issuance, the systemic implications, or how these might be managed. 2
We
structure
our
approach
around
consumer
needs
and
the
associated technical design choices. Current electronic retail money represents a claim on an intermediary, rather than functioning as the digital equivalent of cash. CBDCs could potentially
provide
a
cash-like
certainty
for
peer-to-peer
payments.
At
the
same time, they should offer convenience, resilience, accessibility, privacy and ease of use in cross-border payments. Different technical designs meet these criteria to varying degrees, with attendant technical trade-offs. We explore these issues. The aim is not to promote or highlight any particular approach, but to lay some groundwork for more systematic discussions.
1
We
thank
Morten
Bech,
Codruta
Boar,
Claudio
Borio,
Stijn
Claessens,
Benoît
Cœuré,
Jon
Frost, Leonardo
Gambacorta,
Marc
Hollanders,
Henry
Holden,
Ross
Leckow,
Cyril
Monet,
Hyun
Song
Shin, Rastko
Vrbaski,
Amber
Wadsworth
and
Philip
Wooldridge
for
comments,
and
Haiwei
Cao,
Giulio Cornelli
and
Alan
Villegas
for
exceptional
research
assistance.
The
views
expressed
in
this
article
are those
of
the
authors
and
do
not
necessarily
reflect
those
of
the
Bank
for
International
Settlements.
2
For
the
systemic
implications,
see
the
survey
in
CPMI-MC
(2018).
Andolfatto
(2018),
Kumhof
and Noone
(2018),
and
Bindseil
(2020)
examine
how
the
impact
on
the
central
bank’s
balance
sheet
can be
managed,
while
Brunnermeier
and
Niepelt
(2019)
investigate
how
financial
instability
risks
can be
mitigated.
Our
approach
is
graphically
represented
in
the
“CBDC
pyramid”,
which
maps consumer
needs
onto
the
associated
design
choices
for
the
central
bank.
This scheme forms a hierarchy in which the lower layers represent design decisions that feed into subsequent, higher-level decisions. We
start
by
introducing
the
four
main
design
choices,
as
represented
in
the four layers of the CBDC pyramid. We
assess the legal
structure of
claims
and the operational
roles
of
the
central
bank
and
private
institutions
in
different
CBDC architectures.
We
discuss
the
choice
between
distributed
ledger
technology
(DLT) and
a
centrally
controlled
infrastructure.
We
compare
token-based
systems
and account-based
systems.
Before
concluding,
we
assess
how
the
development
of CBDCs might reinforce current efforts to overhaul cross-border payments.
From
consumer
needs
to
design
choices:
the
CBDC
pyramid
The
focus
of
our
approach
is
the
“retail”
aspect
of
CBDC;
we
ask
what
consumer needs a CBDC could address. 3
We thus sketch the development of a CBDC through an approach that proceeds from consumer needs to design choices. 4
The left-hand side
of
the
CBDC
pyramid
(Graph 1)
sets
out
such
consumer
needs
and
six associated features that would make a CBDC useful. Starting with cash-like peer-to- peer
usability,
these
features
also
comprise
convenient
real-time
payments, payments
security,
privacy,
wide
accessibility
and
ease
of
use
in
cross-border payments. The pyramid’s right-hand side lays out the associated design choices. The consumer’s prime need is that the CBDC embodies a cash-like claim on the central
bank,
ideally
transferable
in
peer-to-peer
settings.
Today,
even
consumers who
normally
prefer
to
pay
electronically
are
confident
that,
if
an
episode
of financial turmoil were to threaten, they could shift their electronic money holdings into cash. This flight to cash has been seen in many crisis episodes, including recent ones.
The
main
concern
is
that
if,
in
the
future,
cash
were
no
longer
generally
3
All
private
sector
non-financial
users
are
referred
to
as
“consumers”
in
what
follows.
For
a discussion
of
“wholesale”
CBDC
for
use
in
the
financial
industry,
see
CPMI-MC
(2018).
4
The
survey
in
Boar
et
al
(2020)
highlights
that
central
banks
have
advanced
other
motivations
for issuance,
including
monetary
policy
implementation
and
financial
stability
considerations.
These aspects
are
considered
in
the
CBDC
design
frameworks
of
Fung
and
Halaburda
(2016),
Bjerg
(2017), CPMI-MC
(2018),
Mancini-Griffoli
et
al
(2018),
Wadsworth
(2018),
Kahn
et
al
(2019)
and
Adrian (2019).
Although
it
takes
a
more
positive
stance
towards
CBDC,
our
focus
on
technical
design elements
is
related
to
Pichler
et
al’s
(2020)
analysis
of
the
limits
of
CBDC
when
compared
with
cash.
86 BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020 Key takeaways
A trusted and widely usable retail CBDC must be secure and accessible, offer cash-like convenience and safeguard privacy. Various technical designs satisfy these criteria to different degrees, and the associated trade-offs need to be identified. The design of a retail CBDC needs to balance the credibility of direct claims on the central bank with the benefits of using payment intermediaries.
accepted, a severe financial crisis might create further havoc by disrupting day-to- day business and retail transactions. 5
At
the
same
time,
consumers
are
unlikely
to
adopt
a
CBDC
if
it
is
less convenient
to
use
than
today’s
electronic
payments.
Banks
and
payment
service providers
run
sophisticated
infrastructures that
can
handle
peak demand,
such
as on Singles Day in China or Black Friday in the United States. And intermediaries help to smooth the flow of payments by taking on risk, for example during connectivity breaks or offline payments. These
two
needs
–
cash-like
safety
and
convenience
of
use
–
lead
to
the foundational
design
consideration
for
a
CBDC
(see
lowest
layer
of
pyramid
in Graph 1):
the
choice
of
the
operational
architecture,
and
how
it
will
balance
the consumer’s demand for a cash-like claim on the central bank with the convenience that
intermediaries
confer
on
the
payment
system.
The
choice
is
shaped
by
two questions. Is the CBDC a direct claim on the central bank or is the claim indirect, via payment
intermediaries?
What
is
the
operational
role
of
the
central
bank
and
of private sector intermediaries in day-to-day payments? Further, the consumer’s need for cash-like payment safety means that a CBDC must be secure not only from the insolvency or technical glitches of intermediaries, but
also
from
outages
at
the
central
bank.
The
choice
is
whether
to
base
this infrastructure on a conventional centrally controlled database or instead on DLT – technologies
that
differ
in
their
efficiency
and
degree
of
protection
from
single
The
CBDC
pyramid
Graph 1
The CBDC pyramid maps consumer needs (left-hand side) onto the associated design choices for the central bank (right-hand side). The four layers of the right-hand side form a hierarchy in which the lower layers represent design choices that feed into subsequent, higher- level decisions. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5
In
Sweden,
where
cash
use
has
already
declined
substantially,
considerations
along
these
lines
have led
the
central
bank
to
propose
a
review
of
the
concept
of
legal
tender
(Sveriges
Riksbank
(2019)).
BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020
87
points of failure. Importantly, this decision can only be made once the architecture has been decided upon, as DLT is only feasible for some operational setups. This is why the choice of infrastructure lies in the pyramid’s second layer. Two
further
consumer
needs
are
easy,
universal
access
and
privacy
by default. 6
From
a
technical
perspective,
there
is
an
underlying
trade-off
between privacy and ease of access on the one hand and ease of law enforcement on the other. The associated design choice – the pyramid’s third layer – is whether access to
the
CBDC
is
tied
to
an
identity
system
(ie
an
account-based
technology)
or instead via
cryptographic
schemes that do
not
require
identification
(ie
an
access technology based on so-called digital tokens). The final consumer need we consider is that CBDCs should also enable cross- border payments. At a design level, this could be arranged via technical connections at
the
wholesale
level
that
are
built
on
today’s
systems.
Alternatively,
novel interlinkages could be envisaged at the retail level, ie allowing consumers to hold foreign digital currencies directly. Importantly, the means of implementing the latter option would depend on whether the CBDC was account- or token-based. This is why this design choice belongs in the top layer of the pyramid.
Architecture:
indirect
or
direct
claims,
and
the
operational role
fo...
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